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A Review of Price, Principle, and the
Environment, by Mark Sagoff
Matthew Steilen*
Environmentalism and economics have a complicated
relationship. Sound environmental policy is often perceived to be
at odds with welfare-maximizing policy; restrictions on the
development and use of land are probably the chief example of
this conflict. At the same time, however, environmentalists often
employ the analytical tools of welfare economics-as well as its
scientific cachet-to provide support for their policies. Thus there
is both a resistance to and reliance on welfare economics. In Price,
Principle, and the Environment,' philosopher Mark Sagoff argues
that, with a few exceptions, environmentalism should cease its
reliance on economic analysis. To understand why Sagoff believes
this, it is helpful to begin by examining some of the intellectual
history he draws upon; for like all troubled couples,
environmentalism and economics have a long past.
In the late sixties and early seventies, neoclassical economists
such as William Nordhaus and James Tobin began to argue that
the scarcity of natural resources did not impose a limit on the
production of goods and services. Instead their models suggested
that technological innovation would always compensate for the
effect of dwindling natural resources.2 A simple explanation
accounted for these results. As natural resource inputs to
J.D. Stanford Law School expected 2009, Ph.D. Northwestern University, B.A.
Carleton College.
1. MARK SAGOFF, PRICE, PRINCIPLE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2004). Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 294 pp. $25 (paper).
2. William D. Nordhaus &James Tobin, Is Growth Obsolete? 5 ECONOMIC GROWTH
509, 523 (1972); see also John Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 THE AMERICAN
ECONOMIC REvIEW 777, 777-78 (1967); Sagoff, supra note 1, at 33.
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production become scarcer, the cost of production using those
resources increases. In competitive markets, this creates an
incentive for producers either to conserve the limited resource or,
more importantly, to substitute a more plentiful resource for the
scarce one. Resource substitution is in turn made possible by
human innovation and technology. Thus, according to Nordhaus
and Tobin, a competitive market incentivizes the development of
means to compensate for nature's dwindling stocks.' Such a view
implies that, for example, if whales had gone extinct in the late
nineteenth century it would have had little economic effect,
despite the contemporary reliance on their blubber. Rather,
people would (and indeed did) develop alternative sources of fuel
and lubrication. Likewise, the disappearance of the last wild
ancestor of cattle 200 years ago was of little moment to producers
who domesticated its descendants.4
The theory that human innovation compensates for the scarcity
of natural resources undercut those environmentalists who had
employed classical economics to justify policies promoting
conservation, or "resource husbandry."5 These environmentalists
had adopted Malthus's argument that the use of natural resources
in production imposed limits on economic growth. From the
standpoint of environmental conservation two limits were central.
First, that natural resource inputs are finite implies that society
must determine an optimal rate of consumption of those
resources, that is, the rate of current consumption that will
maximize welfare over time. Since present supply may affect future
demand, this is not a trivial problem. Second, because the natural
resources necessary for production are finite, production of a good
will cease when the resources required to make it are depleted. By
articulating these problems, classical economics provided
environmentalism with a theoretical basis for advocating the
responsible conservation (and protection) of natural resources.
3. According to Nordhaus and Tobin:
[T]he nightmare of a day of reckoning and economic collapse when, for
example, all fossil fuels are forever gone seems to be based on failure to
recognize the existing and future possibilities of substitute materials and
processes. As the day of reckoning approaches, fuel prices will provide-as
they do not now-strong incentives for such substitutions, as well as for the
conservation of remaining supplies.
Nordhaus & Tobin, supra note 2, at 524.
4. Sagoff, supra note 1, at 34-35.
5. Krutilla, supra note 2, at 777-78.
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The basis was eliminated by the conclusion that technology would
compensate for resource scarcity. As Nordhaus and Tobin saw it,
competitive markets would solve both of the above allocation
problems, by incentivizing resource husbandry and by encouraging
the development of substitutes for scare resource inputs.6
Resource conservation required a new theoretical basis.7
According to Sagoff, this want of theoretical support led
environmentalism to microeconomics, in particular, to the theory
of externalities developed by A. C. Pigou in 1920. Pigou famously
conceptualized pollution as a cost of production imposed on
consumers but unrealized by producers, and thus not reflected in
market price. Similarly, economist John Krutilla conceptualized a
concern for the health of the environment as a consumer
preference. The difficulty with such a preference is that-like a
preference for clean air-it is not readily expressible in the
market; so even though consumers may be willing to pay to protect
the environment, producers do not realize this willingness as
revenue.' Thus, according to Krutilla, the market fails to correctly
price the environment, and regulation should correct for this
failure. In particular, government regulation should protect the
environment in cases where, if the market were functioning
correctly, price would shift upwards to reflect consumer
willingness-to-pay (WTP). Because consumers are willing to pay to
simply preserve the environment in an unchanged state (so-called
"existence value"), Krutilla's work insulates conservation from the
result that human innovation discovers substitutes for scarce
natural resource inputs. Justified by "market failure," conservation
(and preservation) policy thus received a firm theoretical footing
in basic welfare economics.'
6. See, e.g., Nordhaus and Tobin, supra note 2, at 522.
7. Sagoff, supra note 1, at 36.
8. Compare Krutilla, supra note 2, at 779 with Sagoff, supra note 1, at 37-38. It is
not clear to me that Sagoffs reading of the market failure Krutilla diagnoses is
correct. According to Krutilla, the reason private resource owners might fail to
acquire revenue equal to the willingness to pay of individuals is because of the
difficulty of perfect price discrimination. While a few individuals may value a
preserved natural space, many other consumers may not; unless the owner can price
discriminate, he will not realize the former individuals' economic value.
9. For simplicity I have not distinguished preservation policy from resource
conservation policy. In the chapter where Sagoff relates the above intellectual history,
he also does not distinguish the two, but speaks generally of "justifying regulation."
Sagoff, supra note 1, at 36. One could argue that Krutilla's theory justifies
preservation better than it does conservation.
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The economics of this story are familiar. Yet, as Sagoff observes,
Krutilla's defense of environmental regulation is significant for
philosophical reasons as well. A defense of conservation using the
tools of welfare economics embeds assumptions about why it is that
conservation is a wise policy. It is wise, says the economist, because
individuals prefer it. In other words, according to Krutilla
resources ought to be conserved because individual consumers
prefer that certain "natural objects" be preserved in an unchanged
state.'" The value of conservation defended on these terms thus
consists in the benefit nature provides consumers. In philosophical
terms, the value of providing a benefit is instrumental value. Krutilla
therefore defends conservation on instrumental grounds.
Yet, according to Sagoff, instrumental value is not the only kind
of value." We know there are other types of value, says Sagoff,
because we humans make other kinds of judgments than
judgments that something is valuable because it benefits us. First,
we often judge that something is valuable because we regard it as
being good in general, not for us as individuals. For example, one
might argue that conserving resources is the just the right thing to
do; that it is simply right to conserve and not to waste. Sagoff
believes that such a judgment does not reflect the instrumental
value of conservation, but rather its moral value. Second, we
humans often judge something to be valuable because of how it is
on its own, independent of its effects on us. Philosophers call these
independent features "intrinsic" properties. While there are other
intrinsic properties, the one most important to environmentalism
is beauty. According to Sagoff, to regard a mountain as beautiful is
to judge it according to how it is in itself. 2 Many judgments about
the value of protecting the environment are aestheticjudgments.
Sagoff thus argues that we humans make at least three kinds of
judgments (instrumental, moral, and aesthetic), which reflect
three sorts of values. In contrast, welfare economics involves only
instrumental judgments and instrumental value. This paucity is
both a source of strength and weakness for welfare economics. It is
perhaps because it recognizes only the instrumental judgments of
consumer preference that economics can lay claim to being
"objective." After all, it was an accomplishment of microeconomics
10. Sagoff, supra note 1, at 37.
11. Id. at 1-3, 8-11.
12. Id. at 2, 17-18. While certainly plausible, this view of aesthetic judgments is
disputed within philosophy.
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to show that when consumers could express their preferences
(their instrumental value) to producers, goods would be allocated
in a way that produced at least one "winner" and no "losers"-an
objectively superior state of affairs to the one pre-transaction."5 At
the same time, the exclusion of moral and aesthetic judgment
leaves the economic view of human interaction strangely flat. Have
economists nothing to say about the other values humans ascribe
to things in the world? This worry is especially troubling in the
environmental context, where those other kinds of values are
prominent. The environmentalist says that the Grand Canyon is
beautiful and that it would be morally wrong to let it be developed or
destroyed. Thus environmental economists in particular have felt a
push to account for all our judgments and values. They have done
so, Sagoff thinks, by engaging in philosophy. Environmental
economics accounts for the other kinds of judgments we make by
reducing them to instrumental judgments."
In Krutilla's case the reduction was accomplished by
conceptualizing an individual's concern for the environment as a
consumer preference. He understood the expression of concern
for the environment as an instrumental judgment, which evinced a
preference for environmental protection that could be satisfied by
the appropriate regulation. Krutilla's conceptualization of
environmental concern is not a theorem of welfare economics; it
does not concern the proper relation between preference, value,
and price. Rather, as Sagoff correctly insists, it is a full-blown
philosophical theory. 5 Krutilla's is an account of what makes it the
case that individuals care about the environment. What makes it
the case, says Krutilla, is a consumer preference and a WTP. Talk
of moral rightness and beauty is just cover for economic value. 6
It is these philosophical implications, and the economic
theories from which they follow, that Sagoff targets in Price,
13. This is what is known as the Pareto-superior measure of efficiency; it assumes
no externalities. See generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4 (5th ed.
1998).
14. This issue is of course not confined to the environmental context. It has
been a general difficulty in law and economics for some time. See, e.g., Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability, 85
Harv. L. Rev. 1102-04 (1972).
15. See generally id. at 4-6.
16. "What makes it the case" that someone has a concern is not meant to refer
to the (perhaps psychological) cause of the concern, but the ground on which it is
true that the person has the concern. Does the fact that the person has the concern
follow from his having a preference? Whether this is so is a philosophical question.
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Principle, and the Environment. Sagoff makes three basic arguments.
First, he argues that contemporary welfare economics fails on its
own terms as a coherent theoretical framework for addressing
environmental problems. Second, Sagoff believes that the
orientation and methodology employed in contemporary
environmental economics and ecological economics actually
vitiates the environmental movement. He asserts that economic
arguments for the protection and conservation of the environment
alloy the arguments environmentalists should be making. This
criticism in turn suggests the third central argument of the book:
that instead of economic analysis and scientific study,
environmentalists should employ moral and aesthetic arguments
in favor of their policies; and that instead of attempting to achieve
these policies through a nationwide movement relying heavily on
the courts, environmentalists should encourage democratic
deliberation between affected local parties, on the model of the
Quincy Library Group. In what follows, I will briefly examine each
of these arguments.
Sagoff's attack on welfare economics, occurring over the first
half of Price, Principle, and the Environment, is ambitious and
polemical. Much of his ire attaches to the emphasis contemporary
environmentalists place on welfare-maximization in policy making,
as opposed to moral or ethical considerations. Sagoff holds that
environmentalists should not rely on analyses of social welfare in
environmental policy making at all. But this isn't his only criticism
of economic analysis; Sagoff also makes several general attacks on
welfare economics as well. His position can be summarized in the
following five theses: (1) Welfare economics has no normative
foundation; either it is empirically false or it is tautologically true.
(2) The notion of preference on which welfare economics relies is
either unobservable or empirically empty. (3) Price does not relate
to the benefit a good or service provides. (4) WTP is either not
measurable or does not capture benefit. (5) There are no external
costs; thus the analysis of pollution based on externalities is
mistaken Here I have space only to explore the first thesis, that
welfare economics has no normative foundation.
Welfare economics argues that the goal of public policy is to
maximize social welfare, which is in turn measured by WTP.
Markets are typically the best means for consumers to express their
WTP and thus for accomplishing the welfare-maximizing
allocation of goods. But sometimes markets fail. According to one
[Vol. 25:259
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view, when a market fails, preventing consumers with the highest
WTP from acquiring the good or service they prefer, the
government ought to regulate to compensate for the failure. In
this way welfare economics supports certain forms of government
regulation. Because it purports to justify regulation, though, it is
important for the theory to have a normative foundation. A
normative foundation would answer why the government ought to
compensate for market failures, as opposed to, say, simply
permitting them. Why is it a good thing to distribute goods and
services to those who are willing to pay the most for them?
One very basic answer to this question is that WTP evinces
consumer preference. Since individuals are happier when they can
satisfy their preferences, and less happy when they cannot, WTP is
connected to happiness. Happiness in turn is simply good in itself.
Therefore if the market is the best means for distributing goods
and services to those who are willing to pay the most for them, it
follows that the market is the best means for making people happy.
For this reason, a regulatory correction of failing markets is good.
Sagoff observes that this justification for using welfare
economics as a policy science is empirically substantive. That is, it
asserts a relation between an economic behavior, the satisfaction of
preferences, and a psychological state that we ought to be able to
independently verify, happiness. Because it asserts such a
connection, though, the view is open to empirical disconfirmation,
and Sagoff cites several studies which he suggests do just this. 7
Using income as a proxy for the satisfaction of preferences (the
higher one's income, the greater WTP a consumer has), Sagoff
adduces evidence that once basic needs are met increases in
income do not result in increases in happiness. For example, as
buying power climbed in America, happiness did not. Evidently
this is true comparatively as well; "researchers consistently find that
there is very little difference in the levels of reported happiness
found in rich and very poor countries."" Sagoff thus disputes the
empirical connection between satisfaction of preference and
happiness, and with it, the normative basis of welfare economics.
Sagoff is careful to note that there is an alternative
interpretation of WTP that asserts no such connection with
happiness. Sagoff cites Richard Posner, who suggests that the
17. Id. at 48.
18. Id.
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"'most important thing to bear in mind about the concept of value
[in the economist's sense] is that it is based on what people are
willing to pay for something rather than ... happiness.'. 9 On this
view, the thesis that goods should go to those whom they would
benefit the most is not a claim about the happiness those goods
would create in the individual acquiring them. Rather, that an
individual would benefit the most from a good simply means the
individual would be willing to pay the most for it.
Sagoff observes that this makes the fundamental normative
basis of welfare economics as a policy science into a tautology. It is
tautologically true that those who are willing to pay the most for a
good or service value it the most and would benefit the most from
receiving it, since valuing it the most just means being willing to
pay the most for the good or service. But what reason is there for
the government to regulate markets that fail to distribute goods to
those who are willing to pay the most for them?
Sagoff's argument here is apropos, even if not entirely original.
Policy making, as he later says, is not an activity that can be guided
entirely by social science. Social science will not pick out from
among the alternative courses of action those most appropriate for
us citizens because "appropriate" is a normative word. Thus we
require a means to determine whether distributing goods to those
who have the highest WTP is actually (in the normative sense)
appropriate. If economics lacks a normative foundation, then
there is simply nothing internal to welfare economics to
recommend it as against competing regulatory policies. The
appearance of normativity is created, says Sagoff, by the continual
conflation of the empirically false and tautologically true claims
above. It is hard to argue that goods should not be allocated to
those who "value them the most" or to those who would "benefit
the most" from them-unless one remembers that "value them the
most" does not mean what it might ordinarily be supposed to
mean, but simply "is willing to pay the most for them."
Sagoff does not follow this argument to its conclusion, but it is
worth doing so to see its impact on the discussion above. If welfare
and environmental economics are only tautologically true, then
what purports to be an instrumental judgment in favor of
environmental regulation is actually not instrumental at all. For if
welfare economics is only tautologically true, then the sense in
19. Id. at 48-49.
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which a concerned individual benefits from environmental
protection is not the sense in which it is good for that individual.
On the tautological interpretation, "benefit" and "value" are code
words which stand for WTP, not happiness. Since they are code
words (and are not given their normal meaning), they do not
imply that the individual concerned about the environment is any
happier after government regulation. But without some normative
foundation, it is not obvious why the government should intervene
to correct for market failures. Keeping separate the empirical and
tautological interpretations of "benefit" and "value" thus makes
clear what welfare economics must establish to be rightfully
entitled to its role in policy-making, namely, an account of why the
government ought to regulate as the theory recommends.
The second major argument in Price, Principle, and the
Environment is that the use of economics in environmentalism
actually compromises its goals. We can reconstruct Sagoff's
position as the following argument (not meant to be formally
valid):
There are three types of judgments: instrumental, moral and
aesthetic. These are not reducible. To use Sagoffs epigram,
"beliefs are not benefits."
20
Environmental economics and ecological economics employ
instrumental judgments to protect the environment.
These instrumental judgments fail.
These instrumental judgments also undercut the moral and
aesthetic judgments that support protecting the environment.
Therefore, we ought to reject environmental economics.
Step (1) claims there are three types of judgments. Sagoff
supports Step (1) mostly through intuition and casual reflection
about what kinds of things we say, especially about the
environment.
Step (2) uses the philosophical categories of Step (1)-
instrumental, moral, and aesthetic-to analyze the arguments
made by environmental and ecological economists in support of
protecting the environment. Sagoff classifies economic arguments
as purely instrumental for the reasons explained above. Sagoff also
supports this classification by examining particular arguments
20. Id. at 47. "Beliefs are not benefits" is a slogan Sagoff uses to stand for the
idea that aesthetic and moral judgments are not reducible to instrumental
judgments. See id.
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made in environmental and ecological economics. Of particular
note is Sagoff's account of the popular "ecosystem services"
argument, according to which we ought to preserve undisturbed
ecosystems because they can provide valuable services to humans
(for example, purifying water). The argument suggests that we
ought to protect the environment because it provides services for
which we are willing to pay; thus the environment is economically
valuable. As discussed above, this could be considered an
instrumental argument, depending on how we understand "value."
Sagoff's support for Steps (3) and (4) involves some of the
strangest moments of the book. If Sagoff merely regarded the
arguments of environmental economists as wrong-headed because
purely instrumental, one would assume that he would put such
arguments aside and offer his own moral and aesthetic arguments.
But because Sagoff believes Step (4), that instrumental judgments
in support of the environment undercut moral and aesthetic
judgments, he cannot leave the arguments of environmental
economics alone. Thus in the later chapters, Sagoff offers
extended critiques of current instrumental arguments defending
environmentalism like ecosystem services and the justification of
pollution regulation based on its analysis as an external cost.
Sagoff's attack on the ecosystem services argument is especially
eye opening. Much of the impetus for ecosystem services emerged
from an article written in Nature in 1998, in which the authors note
that New York City invested $1 billion to purchase and preserve the
Catskills mountains rather than invest $6-8 billion in a new water
filtration plant."' Biologists have noted that the city's decision to
invest in the Catskills rather than in a filtration plant demonstrates
the valuable services that undisturbed ecosystems can provide.
According to most accounts of the project, increasing agricultural
activity in the Catskills region threatened to inhibit its service as a
natural filter for drinking water in New York City. Rather than
invest in a filtration plant, the city acted to protect the watershed's
natural condition..
According to Sagoff, however, parts of this story are simply
untrue. He claims that increasing development has not threatened
the Catskills watershed because the region has been
developmentally stagnant for some time. For example, the Catskills
population has remained stable since the Civil War. Farms now
21. Id. at 128; Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, Economic Returns from the
Biosphere, 391 NATURE 629, 629-30 (1998).
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occupy less than 5% of the watershed, and industry and residence
each occupy 1% of the land. The majority of the land in the
Catskills is forested or vacant.2 2 Sagoff reports that the only
pollution threat to the city's water supply is increasing fauna,
whose fecal matter causes bacterial outbreaks. Furthermore, a
recent study indicates that the quality of water in New York City
remains good. 23 Thus the city's investment in the Catksills was
triggered, says Sagoff, not by declining water quality but by new
EPA regulations. 24 The investment has come nowhere near the $1
billion dollar mark mention in Nature.25
While Sagoff's investigative journalism regarding what he calls
the "Catskills parable" is welcome, it is unclear why he believes he
must impugn all instrumental arguments in defense of the
environment. Sagoff never offers a convincing defense of Step (4).
Yet Step (4) is crucial to his thesis that instrumental judgments
ought to be eschewed for moral and aesthetic ones. The closest he
comes to a defense of Step (4) are two very brief arguments in
different sections of the book. First, in Chapter Two Sagoff argues
that to defend the environment on moral terms is "to state a moral
fact, and that instrumental judgments about the benefits nature
provides require "surrender[ing]" such statements of fact. Sagoff
does not elaborate on what he means by these claims, and this is
perhaps intentional on his part. What counts as a "fact" is a vexed
question for philosophers. But simply using the term as we
naturally do, it is hard to see how moral judgments are
distinguished from instrumental ones on this ground.
Instrumental judgments surely state facts as well-namely, the facts
of one's preferences. If I say I would prefer a chocolate shake, it
states the fact that I prefer chocolate to the other flavors on offer.
It is also hard to see how making an instrumental judgment could
be thought to require surrendering one's moral judgments on the
matter. In fact, it is natural to suppose that someone prefers to do
what she regards as moral. In other words, the morality of a certain
course of action may be the very reason I benefit by following it.
Doing the right thing makes me happy.
Sagoff s second defense of Step (4), also brief, is that
22. Sagoff, supra note 1, at 131.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 132-33.
25. Id. at 132-34.
26. Id. at 39.
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instrumental judgments undercut environmentalism because they
are subject to change. Instrumental arguments in support of the
environment will change as what benefits individuals changes,
since what benefits individuals is the basis for instrumental
judgment.27 This is certainly true. But of course moral and
aesthetic judgments change as well. I take it as obvious that what
we find beautiful changes over time. A little reflection also suggests
that what we take to be right or morally appropriate changes as
well (regardless of whether it is in fact right or morally
appropriate). In short, Sagoff's worry about the inconstancy of
instrumental judgment applies to moral and aesthetic judgment as
well. All three kinds ofjudgments change.
Yet what is most problematic about Sagoff's philosophical
dispute with environmental ethics is that he provides an
inadequate defense of the core of his position, Step (1). The
trouble is that Step (1) is not an empirical claim, but a
philosophical one. Therefore, even if individuals say things such as
"we ought to save the environment because it is right," or "the
desert is so beautiful," it does not follow that these individuals are
making moral and aesthetic judgments, respectively. They could
be using moral and aesthetic words but making instrumental
judgments. That is, while an individual might say, "we ought to do X
because it is right," he might really mean "we ought to do X
because I prefer that course of action." What he means by what he
says-what makes what he says true or not-is a substantive
philosophical question. Sagoff does observe that people often
express concern for the environment when protecting it would not
obviously benefit them. For example, people often express a desire
to protect areas that they neither will nor desire to visit. Sagoff
suggests that since these individuals will not visit the place nor
desire ro, they do not benefit from its preservation. But, of course,
one may simply like the idea that there are places at the far
reaches of the planet that are left unsullied by human
development. Knowing that this is so may be enough to bring one
pleasure, regardless of whether or not one ever visits such a place.
Indeed, one may have no such desire to visit the place.
These two criticisms-that welfare economics is theoretically
unsound and that its use undermines envitonmentalism-lead
Sagoff to the book's third major argument. Sagoff believes that
27. Id. at 175-76.
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environmentalism should be based on moral and aesthetic
arguments for protecting nature, not on instrumental ones. One
crucial difference between moral judgments and instrumental
judgments in this regard is that the former, but not the latter,
respond to "the force of the better argument. ''28 In other words,
moral and aesthetic judgments can be rationally criticized,
rationally defended, and accepted or rejected on these grounds.
For this reaosn, proper environmentalism has a strong democratic
streak to it according to Sagoff; it is the result of individuals
coming together to exchange reasons why society ought to
preserve and protect the environment and to justify policies on
how to do this effectively. Sagoff repeatedly compares this ideal of
democracy, in which the participants are the locally affected, with
the current system, in which a distant regulatory agency hires
economists to endlessly engage in WTP and cost-benefit studies,
only to have the resultant policy challenged in court by special
interest groups.
Sagoff is particularly enamored of the Quincy Library Group
(QLG).29 QLG comprised environmentalists and loggers from
Quincy, CA, who in the early 1990s negotiated a plan for
harvesting and managing the Plumas, Lassen and Tahoe national
forests, which surrounded the town. Before the QLG was formed,
disputes between environmentalists and loggers in Quincy had
reached a boiling point. QLG was successful in developing a forest
management plan and in civilizing the dispute. After the U.S.
Forest Service refused to implement the QLG plan, its members
went directly to Congress. Congress passed the QLG plan into law,
but allowed a provision for study to ensure that the plan did not
impact endangered species. 30 The Forest Service subsequently
engaged in several impact studies. After a new management plan
was released, QLG sued, arguing that it violated the "letter and
spirit" of the law.31
Despite what he sees as its ultimate failure, Sagoff regards the
direct negotiation between interested local parties in Quincy as a
model for the environmental movement. QLG did not involve
extensive economic studies of WTP and benefit, which Sagoff
regards as worthless and even detrimental to environmentalism.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id. at 201-31.
30. Id. at 223.
31. Id. at 224.
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What it did involve was local parties presenting arguments in
support of competing visions for the appropriate management of
the national forest. By forcing the disputing parties to reasonably
confront each other, the process both calmed the tense
atmosphere and produced a resolution to the dispute.
Furthermore, since the local stakeholders were all involved in the
policy-making process, they could not claim it unsatisfactory later.32
According to Sagoff, Quincy illustrates a model of policy
development that is both thoroughly democratic and effective.
Surprisingly, Sagoff does not indicate whether the arguments
presented by the opposing sides in QLG were moral and aesthetic
or instrumental arguments. It is hard to imagine that they were not
instrumental. The tension in the town was partially the result of
the impact of logging limits on the local economy, and the well-
being of the local economy is a paradigmatic instrumental
concern. A detailed examination of the arguments made would be
a welcome addition, since Sagoff never presents in any detail an
account of how moral environmental deliberation is supposed to
work. In fact, the moral judgments about protecting the
environment that Sagoff adduces have the flavor of epigrams.
"Morality teaches us that we are rich in relation to the number of
things we can afford to let alone."" What this "teaching" could
contribute to policy making in a context like Quincy is unclear at
best. That loggers with an interest in making a living would react
positively to this comment and that it would produce any kind of
workable consensus is perhaps overly optimistic. If anything, it is
likely that moral judgments would serve as starting points for
policy making and that instrumental exceptions would be carved
to meet the exigencies of the moment. Yet Sagoff would regard
this not as progressing, but as succumbing.
Sagoff's notion that local parties should make exclusively moral
or aesthetic arguments in defense of the environment renders
environmentalism oddly cerebral. For Sagoff, environmentalists
should not prefer or desire to protect the environment. Rather,
they should offer "disinterested" arguments that prevail by the
32. As it happened, this did not prevent national environmental groups from
interfering. The Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society and the Audubon Society all
made efforts to prevent the QLG policy from being made into law. Id. at 221-224. The
Audubon Society, whose local chapter was part of the QLG, even sent a letter to the
Senate suggesting that it ignore the local chapter. Id. at 222.
33. Id. at 175.
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force of the better argument. I wonder whether environmentalism
ever really could take such a form. While there are good moral
reasons to want to save the environment, environmentalism as a
movement and a personal orientation does not spring from the
dictates of reason alone. Environmentalism is infused with
"interest," all the way down. While Sagoff has provided
environmentalists a welcome opportunity for critical self-reflection,
one wonders whether he deeply misunderstands the
environmentalist, for whom the destruction of the environment is
not simply irrational but deeply upsetting.
